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EMTALA IN THE '90S -
ENFORCEMENT CHALLENGES
Joan M. Stiebert
Linda J. Spartt
1. INTRODUCTION
ANY DISCUSSION OF THE FEDERAL LAW passed
by Congress in 19861 to ensure universal access to emergency
medical care must first consider the question of nomenclature,
or what to call the subject of this symposium. While consumer
advocates favor the term "patient dumping," bureaucrats may
find it a bit inflammatory. The more neutral "anti-dumping" is
a possible candidate, but may be mistaken for a reference to
the disposal of toxic waste. Many academics know the issue by
the acronym COBRA (for the Consolidated Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1985, of which it was a tiny part), which
lends itself to catchy titles for law review articles like Sharp-
ening the COBRA's Fangs.2 But most people associate CO-
BRA with the extension of health insurance after leaving one's
job - a more popular provision of the same lengthy budget
bill.3 The last option, EMTALA, is used in the name of this
t Medicare Policy AnalystOffice of Legislation, Health Care Financing Administration,
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Washington, D.C.; B.A., Michigan State
University, 1975; M.S.W., University of Michigan, 1982; J.D., Boalt Hall School of Law,
University of California at Berkeley, 1988.
t" Senior Health Insurance Specialist, Center for Medicaid and State Operations, Health
Care Financing Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Baltimore
Maryland; B.S., Hood College, 1981; M.S., Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University,
1987.
1. While the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA) was included in
the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA), it was actually passed
by Congress in April, 1986.
2. See Karen 1. Treiger, Preventing Patient Dumping: Sharpening the COBRA's Fangs, 61
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1186 (1986); Timothy H. Bosler & Patrick M. Davis, Is EMTALA a Defanged
COBRA?, 51 J. Mo. B. 165 (1995).
3. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 § 10001, 42 U.S.C.A.
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symposium and we have, therefore, adopted it in our discussion
below. However, even this acronym is not problem-free. It is
commonly believed to stand for the "Emergency Medical
Treatment and Active Labor Act" - the original name of the
original bill, which became Section 1867 of the Social Security
Act.' In fact, the word "active" was subsequently deleted from
the law,5 since no one could figure out the legal difference
between "active labor" and garden-variety "labor." Fortunately
the acronym EMTALA still works and is in vogue today.
Few aspects of health law have generated as much public
attention or emotional debate as EMTALA, which is still a
source of controversy after over a decade on the books. Several
factors may account for its unique position in the public eye.
First: it is about people in crisis, in the midst of acute medical
emergencies who, without immediate treatment, may be seri-
ously disabled or die. Second: it deals with a fundamental issue
in our health care system - whether access will be driven by
concern about who pays the bill. The need for this law is dem-
onstrated by over forty million people who are uninsured,6 and
by the perception that a large amount of "uncompensated care"
enters the hospital through the emergency department. Third: it
represents a narrow exception to the general rule that we, in
this country, do not recognize a right to health care. But in
1986, Congress decided that it would be unconscionable to
deny treatment to people with life-threatening medical emer-
gencies either because they are unable to pay or for any other
reason unrelated to a hospital's ability to provide such care.7
§ 300bb-2(2) (West 1997) (stating that health insurance coverage may be extended 18 months
from the date of a qualifying event including employment termination and death or divorce of a
covered employee).
4. Social Security Act § 1867, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd. See also 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1395cc(a)(1)(I), (N) (West 1997) (describing additional requirements of a participating hospital
or rural primary care hospital).
5. See The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239,
§ 6211 (h)(2), 103 Stat. 2106, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395dd (West 1997) (eliminating all references to the
term "active" in describing labor).
6. See, e.g., PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMMISSION, 105TH CONG.,
MEDICARE AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM: REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, at 29 (1997)
(reporting that the uninsured population rose from 32 million to 40 million between 1988 and
1995).
7. See, e.g., House of Representatives, 100th Cong., Press Release (announcing hearing on
EMTALA before the Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations Subcomm., Comm. on
Government Operations, and quoting Rep. Ted Weiss who stated that "[transfer of sick or injured
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This Article is based on remarks presented at a sympo-
sium commemorating the tenth anniversary of EMTALA, from
the perspective of the Health Care Financing Administration
(HCFA) - the government agency charged with primary en-
forcement of the law. Unlike most of HCFA's mission, focused
on Medicare and Medicaid,' EMTALA transcends any one
payment source or patient population to reach all patients who
come to a hospital seeking emergency medical care. This dis-
cussion will provide a brief overview of the law's primary
requirements, public and private enforcement mechanisms,
regulations promulgated by HCFA, and a recent work group
convened to recommend changes to the agency's EMTALA
policies and enforcement procedures. It will also discuss new
challenges raised by EMTALA in the current health care envi-
ronment and legislative strategies considered by Congress to
address perceived gaps in the law.
H. BASICS OF THE LAW - EMTALA 101
A. Basic Requirements
EMTALA applies only to hospitals that participate in
Medicare9 (which is almost all hospitals) and that offer emer-gency services.1 However, it applies to all patients who come
persons or women in labor from one hospital emergency room to another because they are
uninsured or on Medicaid is a form of social triage that is absolutely unacceptable in a civilized
society") (on file with author).
8. Medicare, authorized in 1965 under Title XVIII of the Social Security Act, is a federal
health insurance program for the elderly and disabled. Medicaid, authorized by Title XIX of the
Social Security Act, provides health insurance for low-income persons and is jointly administered
by the federal government and the States. These programs together provide access to health care
for over 70 million people, or one in four Americans. The Health Care Financing Administration,
a component of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, is delegated responsibility
for administering Medicare and the federal portion of Medicaid.
9. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395dd(e)(2) (West 1997) (stating that a participating hospital is a
hospital that has entered into a provider agreement pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395cc).
10. See id. § 1395dd(a) This subsection of the statute states that the medical screening
requirement applies to "a hospital that has a hospital emergency department, if any individual...
comes to the emergency department... "' However, subsection (b) states that stabilizing
treatment must be provided "[i]f any individual.., comes to the hospital and the hospital
determines that the individual has an emergency medical condition,..." 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395dd(b)
(1997). This inexact drafting led to some initial confusion about whether the law applied only to
hospitals with a formal "emergency department" or whether it applied more broadly to any
hospital that held itself out to the community as offering emergency services. In support of the
latter interpretation, HCFA noted that Congress did not intend to limit the scope of EMTALA to
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to the hospital seeking emergency care, not just those who are
Medicare beneficiaries." The law requires hospitals to do
three basic things.
First, the hospital must provide an appropriate medical
screening examination to determine if the patient really has a
medical emergency (or is a pregnant woman in labor). 2 Sec-
ond, if an emergency condition exists, the hospital must pro-
vide, within its capability, whatever treatment is necessary to
stabilize the emergency condition. 3 And third, the hospital
may not transfer a patient in unstabilized emergency condition
to another facility unless the patient requests the transfer, or a
physician certifies that the benefits of the transfer outweigh the
risks. 4
B. Enforcement Mechanisms
Congress created two different enforcement mechanisms
for this law - government enforcement by the Department of
Health and Human Services (DHHS), and the right to file
private lawsuits. 5 Government enforcement is split between
two components within DHHS: The Health Care Financing Ad-
ministration may terminate the agreement that allows a hospital
to receive Medicare and Medicaid funds, 6 and the Office of
Inspector General may fine hospitals or individual doctors up
to $50,000 for each violation, and may exclude physicians
from Medicare and Medicaid for gross and flagrant, or repeat-
ed, violations. 7
only hospitals with specifically designated emergency departments. "If so, a facility could easily
circumvent its responsibilities ... simply by renaming the department... or by using an approach
other than departmentalization in providing hospital services. This would clearly contravene the
underlying principle of the statute.' 59 Fed. Reg. 32,086, 32,101 (1994).
11. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395dd(a) (West 1997) (stating that the services participating
hospitals must provide to individuals seeking emergency care and to women in labor are not
restricted to individuals receiving benefits under this subchapter).
12. See id.
13. See id. § 1395dd(b).
14. See id. § 1395dd(c).
15. See id. § 1395dd(d).
16. See id. § 1395cc(b)(2).
17. See id. § 1395dd(d)(1). The amount of the civil money penalty applicable to hospitals
and physicians was increased from $25,000 to $50,000 in 1987. See Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-203, § 4009(a)(1), 101 Stat. 1330, 1356 (1997).
However, a 1990 amendment limits the penalty to $25,000 in the case of a hospital with fewer
[Vol. 8:57
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These are serious penalties because most hospitals, and
many physicians, depend on Medicare for a large part of their
revenue. However, in practice, a hospital with a confirmed
EMTALA violation will only be dropped from Medicare if it
fails to take corrective action within a designated time"3 suffi-
cient to satisfy HCFA that no further violations will occur.
This policy reflects HCFA's priority on obtaining compliance
with the law without reducing the number of hospitals avail-
able to serve Medicare beneficiaries. In cases where penalties
might be warranted despite corrective action by the hospital,
HCFA looks to the Office of Inspector General to impose
monetary fines.
From 1993 to 1995 (the most recent data available), both
the number of "dumping" complaints received by HCFA and
the number of confirmed violations increased significantly. In
1995, HCFA received 460 complaints compared to 308 in 1994
and 338 in 1993. The percentage of complaints leading to
confirmed violations of the law increased from twenty-one
percent in 1993 to thirty-three percent in 1994 and thirty-eight
percent in 1995."9 EMTALA activity has also increased in the
Inspector General's office, which, since 1986, has settled about
seventy cases involving civil money penalties totaling close to
$1.5 million. Approximately half of those seventy cases were
settled in the last two years alone.'
Perhaps recognizing that the government agency would
always have limited resources, Congress also created a private
than 100 beds. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-508, § 4008(b)(2),
104 Stat. 1388 (1990). A third division of DHHS, the Office of Civil Rights, may also investigate
alleged EMTALA violations that might violate the "community service assurance" provisions of
the Hill-Burton Act of 1944. 42 U.S.C.A. § 291c(e) (West 1997) (prohibiting hospitals that have
received Hill-Burton funds for construction and modernization from denying services to any
person who works or resides in the hospital's service area, and requiring "a reasonable volume of
services to persons unable to pay therefor").
18. A hospital that has been found to have violated EMTALA may be terminated from the
Medicare and Medicaid programs if it does not submit a plan of correction that is acceptable to
HCFA within 23 days of the date the violation was confirmed. See HEALTH CARE FIN. ADMtN.,
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, MEDICARE1MEDICAID STATE OPERATIONS
MANUAL, Part 3412 (Rev. 1/95).
19. Enforcement Statistics, Health Care Financing Administration (on file with the
authors).
20. Id. In addition to the settlements negotiated by the Inspector General since 1986, 117
cases were closed without further action, 130 are currently in active negotiation, and 50 cases are
under review by a Medicare Peer Review Organization (PRO).
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right of action, whereby a patient who has been harmed by a
violation of EMTALA may personally sue the hospital for
damages.2 While some critics of the law have complained
that this has usurped state authority by creating a federal form
of medical malpractice law, courts have consistently rejected
that notion over the last ten years. 2 However, EMTALA
claims have become a popular "cause of action" to tack on to
state medical malpractice claims whenever the incident in-
volved a hospital emergency room.
I. THE EMTALA REGULATIONS
A. Rulemaking History
While EMTALA lays out these basic requirements and
procedures, statutes are notoriously ambiguous - the result of
political compromises that muddy what the original sponsors
had in mind. We therefore look to government regulations and
guidelines to clarify and operationalize federal laws. The
rulemaking process for EMTALA was complicated by several
amendments' to the law after publication of a proposed rule
in 1988." On the other hand, HCFA reaped the benefit of
numerous court decisions, which clarified some important as-
pects of the law's interpretation and Congressional intent.
For example, Burditt v. U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services' confirmed that EMTALA's protection is not
21. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395dd(d)(2) (West 1997) (describing the civil remedies available to
a person who has suffered physical harm as a direct result of a participating hospital's violation of
this section). This provision also allows a medical facility that suffers a financial loss as a direct
result of an EMTALA violation to sue the responsible hospital for damages. Id.
22. See, e.g., Vickers v. Nash General Hosp., Inc., 78 F.3d 139,142 (4th Cir. 1996) (stating
that EMTALA was not intended as a federal malpractice statute; citing the same conclusion by the
Ist, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, and D.C. Circuits).
23. See generally Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239,
§§ 6003(g)(3), 6018, 6211, 103 Stat. 2106, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1395ww, 1395ce, 1395dd (West
1997); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, §§ 4008, 4207, 104
Stat. 1388,42 U.S.C.A. 1395y (West 1997) (amending provisions of EMTALA).
24. 53 Fed.Reg. 22,513 (1988) (proposed rules).
25. 934 F.2d 1362, 1373 (5th Cir. 1991) (refusing to find that EMTALA covers only in-
digent and uninsured individuals). See also Brooker v. Desert Hosp. Corp., 947 F.2d 412, 414 (9th
Cir. 1991) (stating that the Act "does not set forth any specific economic status criteria that limit
the types of individuals covered by the Act"); Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare Corp., 933
F.2d 1037, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (stating that "the Act itself draws no distinction between
persons with and without insurance").
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limited to people denied emergency care because they are poor
or uninsured, but applies to all persons who are denied appro-
priate screening or stabilizing treatment, regardless of the
hospital's motive for withholding such care. Johnson v. Univer-
sity of Chicago Hospitals6 addressed the circumstances in
which the law applies when a hospital diverts an ambulance en
route so that the patient never physically arrives at the hospital.
HCFA incorporated these rulings into the interim final
EMTALA regulation, published in 1994,27 and tried to address
other common sources of confusion - for example, whether
the law applies to psychiatric emergencies. (It does.)'
B. Highlights of the Interim Final Rule
The interim final regulation for EMTALA tracks the basic
requirements of the law: that hospitals must provide appropri-
ate screening examinations and stabilizing treatment for medi-
cal emergencies and may not transfer an unstabilized patient to
another facility unless the benefits of the transfer outweigh the
risks.29 The rule also explains the secondary requirements of
26. 982 F.2d 230,233 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that mere contact between an ambulance and
a telemetry system operated by a hospital is not sufficient to trigger the hospital's obligations
under EMTALA). In its interim final regulation, HCFA states that a patient who is in an
ambulance on the hospital's premises, or is off the premises in an ambulance owned and operated
by the hospital, is considered to have "come to the hospital's emergency department" for
EMTALA purposes. 59 Fed. Reg. 32,086, 32,121 (1994). This approach prevents hospitals from
defeating the intent of the law by simply diverting ambulances away from the hospital door, while
following the principle enunciated in Johnson that telemetry contact with a hospital is not by itself
sufficient to trigger EMTALA without some further connection with the hospital. See id. at
32,098.
27. Interim final rle with comment period, 59 Fed. Reg. 32,086 (1994) (codified at 42
C.F.R., part 488 (1997)). The rule is considered "interim" only for provisions that were added
since the proposed rule was published in 1988, to conform with statutory amendments passed in
1989 and 1990. Public comment was invited for these new provisions when the interim final rule
was published, and any comments received will be considered in development of a future final
rule.
28. The preamble to the interim final regulation notes that, while many psychiatric
hospitals do not have organized emergency departments, many do present themselves to the
public as providing care for psychiatric emergencies on a 24-hour walk-in basis. Thus EMTALA
requirements would apply to these hospitals (if they participate in Medicare). EMTALA also
applies to both psychiatric emergencies for which treatment is sought in a general hospital, and to
treatment sought for acute symptoms of substance abuse. These conditions are specifically cited in
the definition of "[e]mergency medical condition," included in the regulation. Id. at 32,121
(codified at 42 C.F.R. 489.24(b) (1994)).
29. 59 Fed. Reg. 32,086, 32,092, 32,120, 32,122 (1994) (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 489.24
(implementing Social Security Act § 1867(a)-(c))).
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the law, many of which were added by amendments to the
statute in 1989 and 1990.30 For example, a hospital must
maintain a list of on-call physicians available to treat emergen-
cy patients, and must post conspicuous signs alerting patients
of their right to emergency care, and whether the hospital
participates in Medicaid.31 A hospital may not delay screening
or treatment to inquire about the patient's payment method or
insurance status. 2 And a hospital with specialized capabilities
(such as a bum, trauma, or neonatal intensive care unit) may
not refuse to accept an appropriate transfer of a patient who
needs such specialized care, within the hospital's capability to
provide it.33
The regulation also specifies that hospitals that receive an
unstable patient whom they have reason to believe was trans-
ferred from another facility in violation of EMTALA must
report the potential violation to HCFA or the state health agen-
cy. Hospitals that fail to report possible violations are them-
selves subject to termination from Medicare.34
30. See generally Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239 §§
6003(g)(3), 6018, 6211, 103 Stat. 2106, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1395ww, 1395ee, 1395dd (West 1997);
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, §§ 4008, 4207, 104 Stat.
1388,42 U.S.C.A. 1395y (West 1997) (amending EMTALA).
31. See 59 Fed. Reg. 32,086,32,089,32,120 (1994) (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 489.20(g)(2))
(1994) (implementing Social Security Act §§ 1866(a)(1)(l)(iii), (N)(iii), (N)(iv), 42 U.S.C.A. 1395
(cc)) (West 1997).
32. See 59 Fed. Reg. 32,086, 32,090, 32,121 (1994) (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(c)(3)
(1994)) (implementing Social Security Act § 1867(h), 42 U.S.C.A. 1395 (dd)(1997)).
33. See 59 Fed. Reg. 32,086, 32,090, 32,122 (1994) (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(e)
(1994)) (implementing Social Security Act § 1867(g), 42 U.S.C.A. 1395(dd)(g)).
34. See 59 Fed. Reg. 32,086, 32,094, 32,120 (1994) (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 489.20(m)
(1994)) (discussing the responsibility of Medicare-participating hospitals to report to HCFA when
they suspect that a patient has been transferred to a facility from another facility in violation of
EMTALA). Some comments to HCFA's proposed EMTALA regulation in 1988 questioned the
agency's authority to require recipient hospitals to report suspected violations, which is not stated
explicitly in the law. The statutory basis for the requirement is found in two provisions of the
Social Security Act: § 1861(e)(9) (authorizing the Secretary of Health and Human Services to
impose rules necessary to ensure the health and safety of persons receiving hospital services), and
§ 1866(b)(2)(A) and (B) (authorizing the Secretary to terminate a Medicare provider agreement
for failure to comply with any program requirement). In the preamble to the interim final
regulation, HCFA notes that receiving hospitals are "in the best position to discern when an
inappropriate transfer has taken place in violation of the statute, because Congress regards them
also as victims of 'dumping."' 59 Fed. Reg. 32107 (1994). See also Social Security Act
§ 1867(d)(2)(B) (allowing hospitals to sue for financial loss suffered as a result of an EMTALA
violation). While the exact impact of the reporting requirement has not been documented, about
half of HCFA's regional offices report that complaints from recipient hospitals about
inappropriate transfers to their emergency departments have increased since the reporting
requirement took effect in September 1995. However, no penalties have been imposed, to date, for
[Vol. 8:57
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Finally, the regulation spells out the procedure to be used
for referral of cases from HCFA to the Inspector General's of-
fice. When an alleged violation involves a question of medical
judgment, HCFA must seek review by the state's Medicare
Peer Review Organization (PRO) before referring the case to
the Inspector General for consideration of civil fines.35 HCFA
also usually seeks PRO review on "medical judgment" cases
prior to deciding whether a violation occurred, though this is
not currently mandated by the regulation or the law.
IV. THE EMTALA WORK GROUP
A. Creation and Goal of the Work Group
As with statutes, the publication of final regulations is not
the last word. Some points, thought to be crystal clear when
the regulation was written, prove ambiguous over time and
issues not initially envisioned by the agency arise. Those regu-
lated by the regulation may also view some rules as unfair,
wrongly applied, or applied inconsistently in different parts of
the country.
In April 1996, the American Hospital Association (AHA)
requested a meeting with HCFA to discuss its members' con-
cerns about HCFA's enforcement of EMTALA. At that meet-
ing, HCFA and the AHA agreed to convene a work group
composed of representatives of professional organizations and
their constituents to examine issues related to EMTALA and its
implementation.
The group first met in June 1996, again in September
1996, and for the last time in January 1997. It included repre-
sentatives of hospital groups, physician groups, managed care
associations, state health departments, HCFA's regional offices,
and consumer groups. 36 The work group's goal was to pro-
a recipient hospital's failure to report a suspected violation.
35. See 59 Fed. Reg. 32,089,32,122-23 (1994) (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(g) (1994))
(implementing Social Security Act § 1867(d)(3)). PROs are federally funded state-level agencies
contracted by HCFA to monitor the utilization and quality of Medicare services in each state. See
generally id. § 489.24(g)(1).
36. Organizations represented on the work group included the American Hospital Asso-
ciation, the American Medical Association, the American College of Emergency Physicians, the
American Association of Health Plans, the Health Care Financing Administration, the Medicare
19981
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duce consensus recommendations for clarifications or changes
to the statute, regulation, or HCFA's interpretive guidelines
(enforcement procedures), with emphasis on changes that could
be implemented quickly without legislative action or a formal
rulemaking process. To achieve this goal, the work group di-
vided into three subgroups addressing the following issues: (1)
definitions and interpretations of key terms in the law, (2) the
enforcement process and procedures, and (3) points of interface
between EMTALA and managed care.
In January 1997, the overall work group submitted recom-
mendations to HCFA on which each of the three subgroups
had reached consensus - that is, the subset of items consid-
ered by the subgroups on which the hospitals, physicians, man-
aged care plans, consumer groups, state health departments,
and HCFA representatives were able to agree.
B. Consensus Recommendations Submitted by the Work
Group to HCFA
Each subgroup considered a range of aspects of EMTALA
that they considered to be unclear, unfair, or inconsistently or
inappropriately enforced. Several examples of topics addressed
by the work group are described below.
1. Definitions Subgroup
The Defimitions Subgroup considered how to further clari-
fy the interpretation of the following key terms in the law:37
a. "Appropriate medical screening examination"
What constitutes an "appropriate medical screening exami-
nation?" The subgroup proposed defining this term as the pro-
cess required to determine, with reasonable clinical confidence,
whether an emergency condition exists, and for such screening
to be applied in a nondiscriminatory manner.38 They noted
Peer Review Organizations, the Association of Health Facility Survey Agencies, the American
Association of Retired Persons, and Public Citizen's Health Research Group.
37. See Recommendations from the Definitional Issues Group of the Section 1867 Task
Force, Draft Nov. 27, 1996, at 2-3 (providing definitional interpretations of "appropriate medical
screening examination" and "to stabilize") (on file with the authors).
38. This clarification proposed by the Definitions Subgroup is consistent with the definition
[Vol. 8:57
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that a screening examination may range from simple to com-
plex depending on the patient's symptoms; that it is not the
same as triage (which merely determines the order in which
patients will be seen, not the presence or absence of an emer-
gency condition); and that the clinical outcome of a patient's
condition should not be the basis for determining whether a
screening examination was adequate.39
b. "Stabilized"
When should an emergency condition be considered "sta-
bilized?" The subgroup proposed different criteria for patients
"stabilized" and then transferred to another facility for further
care, as opposed to patients "stabilized" and then discharged to
home. For patients transferred to another facility, they would
of "medical screening examination" included in the statute at Social Security Act § 1867(a), 42
U.S.C. § 1399dd(a). EMTALA case law decisions have also based the determination of whether a
screening examination was adequate on comparisons to services provided to other patients (for
example insured patients) who presented to the hospital with the same symptoms or complaint.
See, e.g., Brooks v. Maryland General Hosp., Inc., 996 F.2d 708, 710-711 (4th Cir. 1993) (stating
that "the hospital must supply its standard of screening uniformly to all emergency room patients
regardless of whether they are insured or can pay"); Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, Inc.,
917 F.2d 266, 271 (6th Cir. 1990) (finding no indication that the outcome would have been differ-
ent for a patient of different sex, race, national origin, financial condition, etc.).
39. The role of clinical outcomes in EMTALA cases has long been a concern to physicians
and hospitals, some of whom have argued that EMTALA imposes a strict liability standard, which
is inappropriate in the inexact realm of emergency medical care. However, the statute itself
suggests that an objective test is to be used in assessing the adequacy of the care provided to
patients under EMTALA. While not explicitly addressed in the definition of a medical screening
examination, the law defines the term "to stabilize" as the provision of "such medical treatment of
the condition as may be necessary to assure, within reasonable medical probability, that no
material deterioration of the condition is likely to result from the transfer of the individual from a
facility." Social Security Act § 1867(e)(3)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(3)(A) (West 1997)
(emphasis added). This language is based on the common negligence standard, which would con-
sider whether a reasonable physician, under the same or similar circumstances, would have
believed that the steps taken to assess and treat the patient's medical condition were adequate to
confirm or rule out the existence of an emergency, and to stabilize any emergency condition found
to exist. Courts have consistently ruled that a medical screening exam may be deemed adequate
without necessarily producing an accurate diagnosis. See, e.g., Baber v. Hospital Corp., 977 F.2d
872, 879 (4th Cir. 1992) (stating that EMTALA "does not guarantee that the emergency personnel
will correctly diagnose a patient's condition as a result of this screening"); Brooks, 996 F.2d, at
711 (stating that "[the Act does not impose any duty on a hospital requiring that the screening
result in a correct diagnosis."). Thus, an adverse clinical outcome does not necessarily lead to a
finding of a violation. Conversely - for the purpose of government enforcement - the absence
of patient harm does not necessarily prove that no violation occurred. However, the private right
of action authorized by the law, see supra note 21, is limited to cases where a patient can
demonstrate actual harm as a result of an EMTALA violation. Social Security Act
§ 1867(d)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(A).
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consider the patient stabilized if the treating physician reason-
ably believed that the patient was likely to arrive at the second
facility with no material deterioration in his or her condition,
and reasonably believed that the second facility was capable of
managing any follow-up complications to the patient's condi-
tion. For patients discharged to home, they would consider the
patient stabilized if the treating physician reasonably believed
that the patient could have received necessary follow-up care
on an out-patient basis or a later scheduled in-patient basis,
provided that the patient had been given appropriate discharge
instructions and a reasonable plan for follow-up care.
In the case of psychiatric emergencies, the subgroup
would consider patients who are transferred from one facility
to another facility to be "stabilized" when they have been
prevented from injuring themselves or others (such as being
chemically or physically restrained). Psychiatric patients dis-
charged to home would be deemed stabilized when they are no
longer considered a threat to themselves or others.
c. EMTALA and EMS protocols
What is the relationship between EMTALA and emergen-
cy medical services (EMS) protocols?' The subgroup pro-
posed circumstances under which a hospital that complies with
an EMS protocol should be deemed to have met its obligations
under EMTALA. For example, if a helicopter ambulance lands
on the rooftop helipad of one hospital and the patient is imme-
diately transported by ground ambulance to another hospital
pursuant to a community-wide protocol, the patient should not
be considered to have "come to the hospital" for the purpose of
triggering the first hospital's EMTALA obligations.
40. Emergency medical services (EMS) systems provide guidelines for pre-hospital
treatment and transport of patients with emergency medical conditions within a given geographic
area. Such services are generally coordinated by a centralized authority, which can direct
ambulances and emergency service personnel to the most appropriate facility to treat a particular
illness or injury.
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2. Enforcement Procedures Subgroup
The Enforcement Procedures Subgroup urged HCFA to
consider the following changes in its enforcement processes
and procedures:4
a. "Medical care" violations v. "administrative" violations
The subgroup recommended that HCFA distinguish "medi-
cal care" violations from "administrative" violations, with
different enforcement procedures applied to each type. Alleged
medical care violations (for example, complaints about the
adequacy of a screening examination or stabilizing treatment)
would always be reviewed by the State's Medicare Peer Re-
view Organization (PRO) before HCFA made a compliance
determination. In such cases, a 23-day "fast track" termination
process would be allowed only if the hospital's current practic-
es would place patients at risk. Otherwise, the hospital would
have 90 days to submit a plan of correction42 and demonstrate
compliance before it could be terminated from Medicare. In
contrast, alleged administrative violations (for example, failure
to post conspicuous signs about patients' rights under
EMTALA, or to maintain proper transfer records) would not
need PRO review (unless specifically requested by the hos-
pital), and would always follow a 90-day conective action timefiame.43
41. See Memorandum from the Subgroup on Enforcement Process and Procedures to the
Primary Group of Section 1867 Provisions, Dec. 13, 1996 (listing recommendations to be
considered by HCFA) (on file with the authors).
42. A "plan of correction" is a written plan submitted by a health care facility on HCFA
Form 2567 (Statement of Deficiencies and Plan of Correction), describing corrective actions the
hospital will take to remedy cited deficiencies, and the completion date for such correction.
43. Under current policy, a 23-day "fast track" termination timetable is considered
appropriate for all cases where an EMTALA violation has been found. See HEALTH CARE FIN.
ADMIN., supra note 18, at Part 3010. In contrast, a hospital found in violation of one or more of
Medicare's 20 "conditions of participation" (for example, standards for infection control or
nursing services) will only be placed on a 23-day termination schedule when the violation is
determined to pose an "immediate and serious threat" to patients' safety or health. In other cases,
the hospital is given 90 days to submit evidence that the cited deficiencies have been corrected or
that the violation did not, in fact, occur. HEALTH CARE FN. ADMIN., supra note 18, at Part 3012.
The workgroup proposed that the same 23-day and 90-day options be applied to EMTALA
violations as are used for other hospital deficiencies, and that the choice should be based on a
"medical care" versus "administrative" distinction. See Memorandum from the Subgroup on
Enforcement Process and Procedures, supra note 41.
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b. No admission of liability
The subgroup recommended that HCFA specify in regula-
tions that a plan of correction submitted by a hospital does not
imply that the hospital admits that a violation occurred. This
would be analogous to a standard clause included in EMTALA
settlement agreements negotiated by the Inspector General's
office, which states that the hospital or doctor does not admit
to having violated the law but that they agree to pay a speci-
fied sum of money in order to avoid litigation of the case."
Similar clauses are common in all types of legal settlements,
which are intended to dispose of potential litigation without a
trial or formal finding by a jury or court.
c. Simplify procedures and monitor survey agencies
The subgroup recommended that HCFA more closely
monitor state survey agencies' application of the EMTALA
rules4 and simplify its investigation and enforcement proce-
dures. For example, the subgroup urged HCFA to consolidate
all EMTALA rules and guidelines in a single manual for the
regional offices and state agencies, which should also be
shared with the hospitals.
3. Interface With Managed Care
The third subgroup, addressing EMTALA's interface with
managed care, submitted a statement of principles, including
the following points:'
a. Prior authorization
It is not appropriate for a hospital to request, or a man-
aged care plan to require, prior authorization before a medical
44. EMTALA settlement agreements on file with the Office of Inspector General, U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services.
45. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395aa (West 1997) (authorizing the Secretary of Health and Human
Services to contract with state agencies to determine compliance of Medicare-participating
facilities with conditions of participation in Medicare [including compliance with § 1867]).
46. See INTERFACE WITH MANAGED CARE WORKGROUP, CONSENSUS PAPER ON
MANAGED CAREEMERGENCY DEPARTMENT ISSUES RELATING TO COBRA/EMTALA, Draft
revised Nov. 14, 1996 (on file with the authors).
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screening exam or before an emergency condition is stabilized.
However, once the patient is stabilized, EMTALA no longer
applies and the plan may require prior authorization for further
services.
b. Define the emergency according to patient's perspective
Managed care plans should pay for screening examinations
whenever a patient's symptoms could indicate a medical emer-
gency, even if the exam subsequently rules out the existence of
a genuine emergency. This principle represents a tentative
approach to the "prudent layperson" standard, a version of
which was recently passed in federal budget legislation and is
proposed in other bills still pending in Congress (discussed
further below).
c. Determination based on treating physician's judgment
If a disagreement occurs between a hospital emergency
department and a managed care plan as to whether a plan
member has an emergency condition, or whether that condition
has been stabilized, the decision should be made by the exam-
ining physician at the hospital, both for the purpose of the
hospital's compliance with EMTALA, and for the purpose of
the plan's payment for the services.
d. Training for managed care plans
While there seems to be a high level of awareness of
EMTALA among hospitals and emergency room staff, man-
aged care plans are much less familiar with the law and the
obligations it places on hospitals. Thus, the subgroup urged
widespread education about EMTALA for managed care pro-
viders.
C. Comments on the Work Group's Recommendations
In evaluating the work group's recommendations, it is
important to note that some of its proposals are, in fact, al-
ready in HCFA's regulation and policies. The fact that they
show up in these recommendations suggests that either those
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policies are still not understood by all providers or there exists
a perception that they are not enforced properly or consistently.
On the other hand, some recommendations do suggest
changes from current policy, which HCFA has promised to
consider very carefully. However, some proposed changes may
conflict with the agency's interpretation of what the statute
requires. HCFA's internal review of the work group's propos-
als will include a careful legal assessment to identify any pos-
sible conflicts with statutory mandates.
Similarly, the recommendations related to managed care
primarily focus on issues that HCFA lacks statutory authority
to enforce - at least for managed care plans that are not
Medicare contractors. Thus, these proposals should be viewed
- and were apparently intended - as statements of principle
directed at providers, as well as recommendations for change
in Medicare policies.
Finally, apart from the substantive changes that will come
from the work group's recommendations, the group has also
had another very positive effect - as a model of cooperation
between parties with quite differing agendas coming together,
at an early stage, to consider how a government policy should
be created or changed. It is not the first time a process like this
has been used, but the HCFA participants viewed this group as
a particularly successful example of productive, collaborative
policymaking. The process also recognizes that groups affected
by a policy on a day-to-day basis are the real experts, and that
some policies should be changed, some should be better ex-
plained, and some could be applied more consistently.
D. Next Steps Toward Implementing the Work Group's
Recommendations
In January 1997, the work group submitted its recommen-
dations to HCFA, which incorporated them into a draft revision
of the agency's interpretive guidelines for EMTALA. These
guidelines are used to explain the law and regulation to those
who carry out the agency's survey and enforcement activities
- primarily HCFA's ten regional offices and state survey
agencies. The draft guidelines were then circulated to outside
groups for comment, including review by the larger member-
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ships of each of the organizations represented on the work
group. Their comments were used to further refine the draft
guidelines, which were submitted for formal approval within
HCFA in September 1997. After a final version is approved,
training based on the new guidelines will be conducted for
HCFA's regional office staff and state agency surveyors during
fiscal year 1998. This series of steps was originally expected to
be completed by the end of September 1997, but the process
was slowed down by a major reorganization of HCFA, which
took effect on July 1, 1997.
Despite this delay, HCFA has expressed its commitment to
adopt policy and procedural changes that follow the work
group's suggestions as closely as possible. However, the draft
guidelines are not yet approved by the agency. In the end,
some may be excluded, and others may look somewhat differ-
ent once final revisions are made. Issues not addressed in the
guidelines, which may require a regulatory change, will be
considered in the future development of a final EMTALA
regulation.47 The work group also expressed interest in revisit-
ing some issues on which consensus was not reached in its
initial round of meetings.
V. NEW CHALLENGES
While the revised surveyor guidelines will bring a new
level of consistency to the government's enforcement of
EMTALA, the current health care landscape poses daunting
challenges to those who seek to ensure access to emergency
medical care as intended by this landmark law. As a starting
point, it is important to acknowledge without apology that
EMTALA is about access, not payment. It envisioned that
hospitals would have to absorb some uncompensated care, but
by preventing inappropriate transfers, largely to public hospi-
tals,' Congress intended to spread the burden to all providers
47. HCFA will still publish a final regulation for EMTALA to respond to comments re-
ceived on aspects of the 1994 Interim Final Rule implementing amendments to the law that were
enacted in 1989 and 1990, after publication of the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in 1988. See 59
Fed. Reg. 32,086 (1994) (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 488 (1994)).
48. Prior to the enactment of EMTALA, several researchers attempted to calculate the
dollar impact of emergency transfers from private hospitals to public hospitals. A study published
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in a community. However, in 1997 all roads lead to managed
care, which presents new twists not envisioned by Congress in
1986.
A. Challenges Posed by Managed Care
While concerns about access to emergency services once
focused only on hospitals, today the spotlight is more frequent-
ly turned on managed care.49 Hospitals and physicians seeking
to comply with EMTALA have expressed frustration with the
refusal of some plans to pay for emergency care provided to
their members in a non-network hospital.' Unlike the classic
victims of "dumping," these patients are not uninsured, but are
paying premiums to managed care plans for all necessary med-
ical services, including emergency care.
The essential problem is that emergency care is an excep-
tion to the rule that a managed care plan may limit its
in 1986 in the New England Journal of Medicine estimated that, in 1983, emergency transfers
from other hospitals to Chicago's Cook County Hospital (the only public general hospital in that
city) cost the county $24.1 million in uncompensated care, or 12% of the hospital's total operating
budget that year. Extrapolating this result nationally, the authors estimated "an annual cost shift of
hundreds of millions of dollars from the private to the public sector." Robert L. Schiff et al.,
Transfers to a Public Hospital: A Prospective Study of467 Patients, 314 NEw ENG. J. MED. 552,
556 (1986). See also David U. Himmelstein et al., Patient Transfers: Medical Practice as Social
Triage, 74 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 494, 495 (1984) (suggesting that '"[dumping' unprofitable
patients and services may be responsible for at least part of the deficits which have plagued public
hospitals and represents a de facto public subsidy to private hospitals"). In their periodic reports
on HCFA's enforcement of EMTALA, Public Citizen's Health Research Group has noted that for-
profit hospitals are significantly more likely than non-profits to violate the law. In 1993 through
the first quarter of 1995, between 27 and 29% of the hospitals cited by HCFA for EMTALA
violations were for-profit hospitals while only 14 to 19% of all general hospitals in the United
States were for-profit during this period. See JOAN STIEBER & SIDNEY M. WOLFE, PUBLIC
CIniN's HEALTH RrsEARcH GROUP, UPDATE ON "PATIENT DuMPING" VIOLATIONS (Oct. 1994)
(citing statistics for patient dumping violations); LAUREN DAME & SIDNEY M. WOLFE, PUBLIC
CmIzEN's HEALTH RESEARCH GROUP, UPDATE. PATIENT DUMPING IN HoSPITAL EMERGENCY
ROOMs (Mar. 1996) (giving statistics regarding hospitals and doctors cited for patient dumping).
49. The term "managed care" encompasses a range of health care delivery and financing
arrangements which seek to control costs through a variety of mechanisms. Common strategies
include use of primary care "gatekeepers," prior authorization for specialty care, and stringent
utilization review procedures. Many insurers that pay for health care on a traditional fee-for-ser-
vice basis have also adopted some managed care techniques, often by paying a substantially
greater portion of the bill for services furnished by a "preferred provider." As used in this Article,
the term "managed care" refers to any arrangement that in some way limits a patient's choice of
provider.
50. See, e.g., Standards For Health Plans Providing Coverage In The Medicare Program:
Hearing Before The Subcomm. On Health Of The Comm. On Ways And Means and The
Subcomm. On Health And Environment Of The Comm. On Commerce, H.R. 104th Cong. 150
(1995) (statement of Richard V. Aghobabian, M.D., American College of Emergency Physicians).
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members' choice of doctor or hospital to those providers who
have negotiated contracts with the plan. But in the case of
medical emergencies, plans generally agree that the patient
may go to the nearest hospital, whether or not it is a partici-
pant in the plan. Medicare-participating managed care plans
must cover emergency care by non-plan providers without
requiring prior authorization from the plan."1
This broad obligation to pay for emergency services has
led to new scrutiny of what qualifies as an "emergency." In
cases where a non-plan hospital provides a medical screening
examination - as mandated by EMTALA - and determines
that the patient's chest pain was indigestion, not a heart attack,
the plan may say: "Sorry, not a true emergency. We won't
pay. 52
B. Legislative Proposals About Emergency Medical Care
1. Establishing a "prudent layperson" standard
A popular response to this dilemma is the so-called "pru-
dent layperson" standard, versions of which are included in
legislation passed (or being considered) by a number of
states, 3  in the balanced budget bill signed by President
Clinton on August 5, 1997 (as applied to Medicare and Medic-
aid managed care plans), 4 and in several bills still pending in
51. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395mm(c)(4)(B) (West 1997) (requiring Medicare-contracting
managed care plans to cover emergency services provided "other than through the organization")
(amended by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105-33, § 4001, effective Jan. 1, 1998,
which also prohibits prior authorization requirements for emergency services); 42 C.F.R.
§ 417.401 (1997) (defining "emergency services" to include services provided by "other than the
HMO or CMP"); 42 C.F.R. 6,414(c)(1) (prohibiting managed care contractors from requiring
prior authorization for emergency services).
52. See, e.g., Emergency Doctors Faced with Catch-22 as HMOs Impede Access to
Emergency Care, Health Letter (Pub. Citizen Health Res. Group, Wash., D.C.), Feb. 1995, at 1
(offering scenarios where necessary emergency services are not covered by HMOs); Robert Pear,
HMO's Refiusing Emergency Claims, Hospitals Assert, N.Y. TIMEs, July 9, 1995, at Al
(illustrating the frustration physicians experience when they think a patient is in need of
emergency care and the HMO refuses to pay, claiming it is not an emergency).
53. See Diane E. Hoffman, Emergency Care and Managed Care - A Dangerous
Combination, 72 WASH. L. REv. 315, 368-69 (1997) (describing and analyzing how current
restrictive plan practices related to emergency medical treatment harm both patients and providers
and arguing for legislative action); Anthony So, Access to Emergency Services (June 19, 1997)
(preliminary draft of unpublished manuscript prepared for the Subcommittee on Consumer Rights,
Protections, and Responsibilities of the Advisory Commission on Consumer Protection and
Quality in the Health Care Industry) (on file with the authors).
54. See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4001, 111 Stat. 251,290 (to
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Congress (which would apply to all payers, not just Medicare
and Medicaid). The common element of all these proposals
is that they would define a medical emergency from the per-
spective of a reasonable layperson experiencing symptoms (e.g.
chest pains) rather than the perspective of a physician or in-
surer after-the-fact. Specifically, "emergency medical condi-
tion" is defined in most of the proposals as:
[A] medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of
sufficient severity (including severe pain) such that a prudent
layperson, who possesses an average knowledge of health and
medicine, could reasonably expect the absence of immediate
medical attention to result in (i) placing the health of the indi-
vidual (or, with respect to a pregnant woman, the health of the
woman or her unborn child) in serious jeopardy, (ii) serious
impairment to bodily functions, or (iii) serious dysfunction of
any bodily organ or part.'
This definition closely parallels that included in EMTALA, 7
and is clearly intended to bridge the gap between those servic-
es that hospitals are mandated to provide under EMTALA and
those services for which managed care plans are obligated to
pay. The new balanced budget law and the pending bills would
also require plans to cover emergency services "without regard
to prior authorization or the emergency care provider's contrac-
tual relationship with the [plan]." 8
be codified at 42 U.S.C.A. 1395W-21) (defining "emergency services" according to a "prudent
layperson" standard for Medicaid managed care plans); Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub L. No.
105-33, § 4704, 111 Stat. 251,496 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396v) (defining emergency
services according to a "prudent layperson standard" for Medicaid managed care plans).
55. See Access to Emergency Medical Services Act of 1997, S. 356, 105th Cong.
§ 9811 (a)(2)(A) and H.R. 815, 105th Cong. § 9811 (a)(2)(A); Health Insurance Bill of Rights Act
of 1997, S. 373, 105th Cong. § 2771 (1997), and H.R. 820, 105th Cong. § 2771 (1997)
(establishing standards for protection of consumers in managed care plans and other health
insurance coverage); Patient Access to Responsible Care Act of 1997, S. 644, 105th Cong. § 2771
(1997) and H.R. 1415, 105th Cong. § 2771 (1997) (establishing standards for relationships be-
tween group health plans and health insurance issuers with enrollee, health professionals, and
providers); Managed Care Consumer Protection Act of 1997, H.R. 337, 105th Cong. (1997)
(amending standards for Medicare supplemental policies, modifying the Medicare select program
and providing other protections for beneficiaries of health plans generally); Quality Health Care
and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 1222, 105th Cong. § 5(B)(2) (1997).
56. See, e.g., S. 356 § 9811(a)(2)(A) and H.R. 815 § 9811(a)(2)(A) (defining "emergency
medical condition").
57. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395dd(e)(1) (West 1997) (defining "emergency medical condi-
tion").
58. See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4001, 111 Stat. 251,290.
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However, the legislative proposals have also differed on
some points, the most hotly contested of which has been
whether the definition of an emergency medical condition
should include an explicit reference to "severe pain." This
phrase was deleted from the "prudent layperson" standard in
the preliminary balanced budget bill that was passed by the
House of Representatives in late June 1997.' While some
observers at first assumed this to be an oversight, it became
clear that it was a deliberate omission undertaken in response
to intense lobbying by the managed care industry.' The plans
objected to the phrase as "a highly subjective term [that] has
vast differences in meaning among consumers, depending on
their threshold or tolerance for pain."61 One Health Mainte-
nance Organization (HMO) lobbyist reportedly argued that
inclusion of "severe pain" would "require health plans to pay
for patients who stubbed their toes and went to emergency
rooms for treatment."' 2 Managed care representatives reasoned
that the "prudent layperson" standard (without explicit refer-
ence to "severe pain") would sufficiently protect consumers
who reasonably believe that their health would be in jeopardy
without immediate medical care.
On the other side of the issue, the American College of
Emergency Physicians (ACEP) argued that omitting "severe
pain" from the "prudent layperson" definition "would create a
loophole for health plans to deny coverage for .. . beneficia-
ries who, in severe pain, make a reasonable decision to seek
emergency care. This is not only unfair, but dangerous to a
patient's health." 3 For example, they noted that severe ab-
dominal pain (the leading reason for visits to emergency
59. See H.R. 2015, 105th Cong. §3463 (1997).
60. See Robert Pear, H.M.O.'s Fight Plan to Pay For Some Emergency Care, N.Y. TIMES,
June 25, 1997, at A16 (discussing the debate over whether to include "severe pain" as a
justification for an emergency room visit covered by managed health care plans).
61. Id. (quoting "talking points" prepared by the American Association of Health Plans).
62. Id Similar remarks personally observed by the authors at a meeting of the Subcom-
mittee on Consumer Rights, Protections, and Responsibilities of the Advisory Commission on
Consumer Protection and Quality in the Health Care Industry, June 25, 1997, Washington, D.C.
63. Letter from the American College of Emergency Physicians and 41 co-signatory
organizations to Rep. William M. Thomas, Chairman, Health Subcommittee of the Ways &
Means Committee, U.S. House of Representatives (July 11, 1997) (on file with the authors).
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rooms) may be a sign of appendicitis, gallbladder infection,
ectopic pregnancy, or a ruptured spleen - all of which may be
life-threatening if not treated immediately." ACEP reasoned
that "severe pain" would be covered only when the overall
"prudent layperson" standard was met. Thus, "health plans
would not be required to pay for every patient that reports to
an emergency room with severe pain."'65
However, the most compelling legal argument for retain-
ing the phrase is that it has been included in EMTALA for
over a decade. If omitted from the "prudent layperson" defini-
tion, ACEP said, "Congress [would] be creating one standard
for care and a much lesser standard for coverage that would
leave insured consumers paying the bill." In the end, the
Senate - which had endorsed a definition with the disputed
phrase intact - refused to bend on this point in the budget
reconciliation process. Thus, the "prudent layperson" standard
included in the final budget bill67 includes reference to "se-
vere pain," as it appears in EMTALA and other statutory pro-
visions.'
A further point of controversy in the "prudent layperson"
proposals involves language included in almost all of the bills
that would limit "prudent layperson" protection to those with
"an average knowledge of health and medicine." In contrast,
the Clinton Administration's budget proposal for fiscal year
1998' did not include this condition, which HCFA viewed as
64. See id.
65. Id.
66. lId
67. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4001, 111 Stat. 251,290 (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395w-22) (defining the "prudent person standard").
68. Provisions of federal law besides EMTALA include the phrase "severe pain" in defin-
ing an "emergency medical condition." See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1)(K)(i) (West 1997)
(authorizing limits on "reasonable costs" for hospital outpatient services other than "bona fide
emergency services"). In a review of state laws, the American College of Emergency Physicians
identified at least 10 states that include reference to "severe pain" in a statutory definition of
"emergency services" or "emergency medical condition." Those states include Arkansas,
California, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, New York, Texas, Virginia, and Washington.
See Facsimile Transmission from the American College of Emergency Physicians, Language from
State Laws that Include "Severe Pain" in the Definition of Emergency Services or Emergency
Medical Condition (July 10, 1997) (listing excerpts from a variety of state laws) (on file with the
authors).
69. President's Budget Proposal for Fiscal Year 1998, § 11403. ExcERFr FROM PROPOSED
LEGISLATION FOR MEDICARE PORTION OF PRESIDENT CLINTON'S FIscAL YEAR 1998 BUDGET
BILL § 11403 (1997) (addressing Medicare-contracting managed care plans' obligation to cover
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providing less protection to beneficiaries than its current poli-
cy. It also confuses the common objective legal standard,
which considers what a "reasonable person" would do under
same or similar circumstances - whether or not those circum-
stances include an "average knowledge of health and medi-
cine." As an alternative, the Administration bill included the
phrase "from his or her perspective," to make clear that the
patient's own perspective is paramount. However, this proposal
was not adopted by the House or Senate budget committees,
and the reconciliation budget bill retained the "average knowl-
edge" language found in other proposed legislation, ° as well
as in "prudent layperson" laws enacted in several states.7
Apart from these differences, the degree of consensus in
support of a "prudent layperson" standard is remarkable given
the controversy it generated when it was first introduced in
federal legislation in 1995.72 While some disagreements linger
emergency services) (on file with the authors).
70. See, e.g., Access to Emergency Medical Services Act of 1997, S.356, 105th Cong. §
9811 (a)(2)(A) (1997); H.R. 815, 105th Cong. § 9811(a)(2)(A) (1997).
71. See Hoffman, supra note 53, at 392 n.356 (citing examples of state statutes using the
"prudent layperson" standard); See also Facsimile Transmission from American College of
Emergency Physicians, supra note 68.
72. See Access to Emergency Medical Services Act of 1995, H.R. 2011, 104th Cong.
(1995) (outlining the actions to be taken "to assure equitable coverage and treatment of
emergency services under health plans"). In comments on H.R. 2011 submitted by the Health
Care Financing Administration to Rep. Benjamin Cardin in September 1995, the agency advised
against applying a "prudent layperson" standard to Medicare or Medicaid "because the primary
protections afforded by the bill already exist for Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries." HEALTH
CARE FINANCING ADMIN., COMMENTS ON THE APPICATION OF H.R. 2011 (CARDIN BILL) TO
MEDICARE AND MEDICAID, AND TO OTHER PAYORS (1995). However, the agency was eventually
convinced that a statutory clarification would strengthen its policy, which was previously
described only in manual instructions and operational policy letters to Medicare-contracting
managed care plans and State Medicaid Directors. See id. (quoting the Health Care Financing
Administration's Medicare HMO/CMP Policy Manual § 2104, which directs plans not to
"retroactively deny a claim because a condition, which appeared to be an emergency, turns out to
be non-emergency in nature"); HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMNISTRATION, OFFICE OF
MANAGED CARE, OPERATIONAL POLICY LErrTTER 95-5 (Financial Responsibility for Emergency
Services) sent to Medicare-Contracting Health Maintenance Organizations and Competitive
Medical Plans (March 27, 1995); Letter from Gale A. Drapala, Deputy Director, Office of
Managed Care, Health Care Financing Administration, to state Medicaid director (OcL 13, 1995)
(on file with the authors) (regarding managed care plans and emergency services). Similarly, the
American Association of Health Plans (the national trade association for managed care plans) at
first opposed the "prudent layperson" proposals because it feared that the standard would
undermine efforts to reduce inappropriate use of hospital emergency rooms. However, in 1997,
the Association released its "Putting Patients First!' initiative, which stated that "[h]ealth plans
should cover emergency-room screening and stabilization as needed for conditions that
reasonably appear to constitute an emergency, based on the patient's presenting symptoms." Am.
Ass'n. of Health Plans, Press Release, Health Plans Announce Policies on Appeal Rights and
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over the exact wording to be used, there is now wide accep-
tance of the need for a "prudent layperson" standard and a ban
on requiring prior authorization for emergency care.
2. Requirements for "post-stabilization" care and limits on
cost-sharing
Some bills pending in Congress go beyond both the "pru-
dent layperson" standard and the reach of EMTALA to address
what happens to a managed care patient in a non-plan hospital
whose emergency condition has been stabilized, but who may
need further non-emergency care, which the non-plan hospital
would like to provide. These bills would set rules for when
such care would be deemed to be authorized, with or without
prior approval by the plan. For example, the "Access to Emer-
gency Medical Services Act of 1997"' 3 would require plans to
cover "maintenance"74  and "post-stabilization '  care identi-
fied as necessary through a medical screening exam if the
treating physician at a non-plan hospital makes a good faith
effort to contact the plan for its authorization within thirty min-
utes of determining that the patient's condition has been stabi-
lized.
The bills would also set rules related to cost-sharing76 for
emergency services. For example, plans would be barred from
imposing greater cost-sharing for use of a non-plan emergency
provider if circumstances prevented the patient from reaching
an in-plan hospital. However, plans would be allowed to im-
Emergency Care Coverage, Jan. 30, 1997.
73. S. 356 § 981(b)(3)(A) and H.R 815 § 981(b)(3)(A) (assuring access to emergency
medical services under group health plans, health insurance coverage, and Medicare and Medicaid
programs).
74. S. 356, 105th Cong. §9811(b)(3)(A) (1997) and H.R. 815, 105th Cong.
§ 9811(b)(3)(A) (1997) (defining "maintenance" care as medically necessary non-emergency
services needed to ensure that a patient remains stabilized from the time that the treating hospital
attempts to request authorization from the plan until (1) the patient is discharged from the
emergency department, (2) a plan physician assumes responsibility for the patient's care, or (3)
the treating physician and the plan agree to another arrangement).
75. S. 356, 105th Cong. §9811(b)(3)(B) (1997) and H.R. 815, 105th Cong.
§ 981 l(b)(3)(B) (1997) (defining "post-stabilization" care as medically necessary non-emergency
services required by a patient who is determined to be in stable condition).
76. Cost-sharing refers to the portion of the bill for a medical service that the patient is
responsible for paying out-of-pocket. In some cases, this is set as a percentage of the total amount
(for example, 20% of the payment amount approved for the service by Medicare or a private
insurer) or as that fee (for example, $10 per incident of service).
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pose greater cost-sharing for services furnished in an emergen-
cy department rather than in another setting, as long as the
amount is reasonable.'
A simple provision related to "maintenance" and "post-
stabilization" care (but not cost-sharing) was also included in
the balanced budget bill as applied to Medicare and Medicaid
managed care plans. That new law requires plans to cover such
care in a non-plan hospital, subject to guidelines that may be
established by the Department of Health and Human Services
to "promot[e] efficient and timely coordination of appropri-
ate.., care of [a plan] enrollee after the enrollee has been
determined to be stable under section 1867. '
VI. CONCLUSION
Both -the recommendations of the work group convened by
HCFA last year and Congress' endorsement of a "prudent
layperson" standard for emergency services represent signifi-
cant steps toward ensuring that the mandate of EMTALA is
still alive and enforced in a meaningful way. They also serve
as reminders that the problems EMTALA was intended to
address do not exist in a vacuum, but are influenced by other
policy decisions and developments in the medical marketplace.
While the health care landscape of the '90s may have
looked unrecognizable in 1986 when EMTALA was passed,
the more things change, the more they stay the same.
EMTALA was landmark legislation in 1986 and it is still
acutely needed today. In that context, HCFA has undertaken a
dual commitment to respond to feedback from hospitals, doc-
tors, patients, managed care plans - the true experts in the
field - about how its EMTALA policies and procedures can
be improved, while simultaneously maintaining its commitment
to carry out the role delegated to it by Congress - to ensure
that no person will be denied access to emergency care because
of their type of insurance, whether they have insurance at all,
or any other non-medical reason.
77. See S. 356, 105th Cong. § 9811(c) (1997) and H.R. 815, 105th Cong. § 9811(c) (1997)
(limiting cost-sharing for services furnished in emergency departments).
78. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, §§ 4001,4704, 111 Stat. 251,290.
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